In a decision process (gambling or dynamic programming problem) with finite state space and arbitrary decision sets (gambles or actions), there is always available a Markov strategy whieh uniformly (nearly) maximizes the average time spent at a goal. Jf the decision sets are closed. there is even a stationary strategy with the same property.
Introduction
The subject of this paper is finite state, di~crete time decision processes with single fixed goals and arbitrary decision sets (all to be defined precisely in Section 2). Various objective functions associated with such ;>Tocesses have been studied extensively, among them: maximizing the probability of reaching the goal [7, 8, 15, 19, 20] ; minimizing the expected time or cost to the goal [4, 5, 12, 13, 16, 17] ~ maximizing the expected total number of times at the goal [15] ; maximizing the expected total discounted rewards at the goal [2, 6, 13, 16] ; maximizing the probability the goal is hitinfmitely often [7, 11, 19, 20] ; and maximiz ing the expected average time at the goal [3, 6, 10, 13, 16] . We are concerned here with this last objective; finite state goal problems with average reward criterion,
In the pioneering work of Howard [14 1 , and much of the subsequent research, e.g. Ross [16] , the assumption of finiteness of number of gambles available at each point was essential, and led to constructive determinations of an optimal stationary strategy. If the number of gambles at some states are infinite, however, optimal strategies need not exist, and station3i'y strateg.es are not at all good in general. Ross [16, p. 144] has raised the question of determining the smallest class of strategies which are e-optimal for average reward problems. This problem has been studied by Chitashvili [3] and Fainberg [10] . It is the purpose of this paper to completely answer that question in the case of finite state goal problems.
It is shown in Theorem I that in every such problem with closed sets of gambles there always exists a stationary strategy which is uniformly e-optimal; this result is used to show (Theorem 2) that in the finite state goal problem with arbitrary decision slets there always exists a Markov strategy which is uniformly nearly optimal. Examples are given to show that the relationship between these average reward problems, and problems with discounted or finite horizon objectives, is not very close.
Statements of results
Definition 2.1. As in [4] , a finite state goal problem is a triple (X. r. g). where X l !oo a finite set, r associates to each point x E X a nonempty collection r(x) of probability measures on X, and g E X is a distinguished element of X.
The set X represents the state space or fortune space of the process, F( x) the actions or gambles available at the state x, and g the 'goal' state.
Much of the notation will follow that of Dubins and Savage [7] . The Dirac delta-measure at x will be denoted by S(x). A strategy is a function from finite sequences in X (including the empty sequence '0') to probability measures on X. The same symbol. u, will be used to denote both a strategy and the probability measure generated by u on the product sigma-algebra on X'" (X endowed with the discrete sigma algebra). E"f will denote the integral of f with respect to CT 
Remark. In most of the previous research on average reward problems the payoffs A 2 and A] have been used, apparently for mathematical expediency. The average reward criterion A(u) defined above seems more natural to th? authors, and in any event it turns out (Corollary following Theorem 2) that these criteria are equivalent for finite state problems.
The following theorem,. the· main result of this paper, states that in every finite state goal problem with closed (hence compact) sets of gambles, there always exists a stationary strategy which is uniformly nearly optimal. between the l3-discounted payoff and the average reward payoff. This approach won't work for payoff A. As the following example, which is similar to example 3 of Bather [2], shows even if the limit of good (discounted or finite horizon) strategies exist, this limiting strategy may be wort:lles<; in all respects.
As f3 ~ 1, the limit of good strategies for the l3-discounted re\:ard problem exists, and in fact is the stationary strategy which uses B( a) at state'a', Similarly for the limit. as n ~ 00. of strategies which are good for the n-step problem. But using 8(a) always at state •a' will never lead to the goal. 
Proofs
The proof pf Theorem 1 requires several lemmas. The first is an easy exercise.
Lemma I N(n)
Iimsup ml( 1'1 + ... + T m ) =Iimsup--. Since £ was arbitrary, the proof will be complete once it is shown that EcA T I ) < a + 3£. (4) Case 1. E a ( T t ) < 00. Pick M so that
By (3) we can pick K ~ M so that
UK
Since K ~ M, it follows that
Hence
where the inequalities follow from (2), (7), (6) and (5) respectively. This completes Case 1.
Case 2. Err ( T,) = 00. Pick M so that b"".r( T t 1\ M) ~ a + 1, and pick K ~ M as in 
n almost surely for all u in r at g. Since E > 0 was arbitrary, the desired conclusion follows from (8).
Case 2 a =00. Then (9) Let C c X be the closed communicating class relative a""" containing g (which is dearly recurrent). By [7, Theorem 3.9.2] there is a stationary strategy (TX''' in r 
A(a'[x])?-A((T)-·2F.
(11)
Fix (T E 1"/ x. By [16, Theorem 4.71, (9), (10) and the fact that a? 1, it follows that 
for all x EX. 
However. the proof of Theorem 2 shows that there is always a Markov strategy which is uniformly (nearly) optimal with respect to A, A., A 2 • and A 3 simultaneously. In fact the e-optirnal strategies constructed in Theorems 1 and 2 are even easily seen to be persistelllly e-optimal [8], since uniformly good stationary strategies are automatically persistently good.
Other reward criteria
This paper leaves open the question of whether stationary strategies (in the IXI < 00, r = t case) and Markov strategies (ill the general IXI < 00 case) are uniformly adequate for the more general avprage reward problem in which reward r(x) is obtained at each visit to state x. ThlY suspect the answer is affirmative, but the techniques u~cd in these proofs do (lot (. ven clfry over in the special case of a goal set G c X (i.e. r(x) = 1 if x E a, =0 otherwis t :), even if r == t. If one is at state a, and wishes to minimize his expected time to 0, or maximize his probability of hitting G (approaches used in the above proofs), he uses ~(g'), which is bad for maximizing the average time in G.
The relationship between the average reward criterion, and discounted or finite horizon reward payoffs seems to be rather weak, perhaps because for the average reward problem, a gambler is not penalized for 'resting' at neutral states for long periods initially, as long as he-['ventually makes good decisions later. In discounted, or finite horizon problems, on the other hand, the gambler is penalized heavily for staying at worthless states for,long periods initially, but is not penalized much for making bad decisions in the distant future. Neither the e-optimal stationary strategies guaranteed by Blackwell's results [2] for the discounted reward problem, nor the F-optimal Markov strategies found by backward induction [6, 13] seemed useful in <Jnalyzing the average reward problem.
